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Uncoordinated individuals in human society pursuing their personally optimal strategies do not
always achieve the social optimum, the most beneficial state to the society as a whole. Instead,
strategies form Nash equilibria which are often socially suboptimal. Society, therefore, has to pay a
price of anarchy for the lack of coordination among its members. Here we assess this price of anarchy
by analyzing the travel times in road networks of several major cities. Our simulation shows that
uncoordinated drivers possibly waste a considerable amount of their travel time. Counterintuitively,
simply blocking certain streets can partially improve the traffic conditions. We analyze various
complex networks and discuss the possibility of similar paradoxes in physics.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Hc, 87.23.Ge, 89.75.Fb, 89.65.-s, 89.65.Gh, 02.50.Le
Many real-world transportation systems in human so-
cieties are characterized by networked structures and
complex agents interacting on these networks [1]. Un-
derstanding the agents’ behaviors has important conse-
quences for the optimal design and control of, for exam-
ple, the Internet, peer-to-peer, or vehicle networks [2].
In fact, optimality has long been a key principle in sci-
ence. In particular, many branches of physics are gov-
erned by principles of least action or minimum energy in
the same way that maximizing utility functions is crucial
in economics. For example, the flow of currents in a re-
sistor network can be derived by minimizing the energy
dissipation. One might expect that traffic flows in trans-
portation networks follow a similar optimization princi-
ple. It is indeed reasonable to assume that humans opt
for the strategies that maximize their personal utility.
However, this does not mean that flows in transportation
networks minimize the cost for all users as is sometimes
assumed [3]. On the contrary, we will demonstrate that
the flows can in reality still be far from optimal even if all
individuals search for the quickest paths and if complete
information about the network and other users’ behav-
iors is available. Thus, traffic networks can be inherently
inefficient – a fact rarely investigated in previous work
on traffic flows [4].
In this paper, we investigate decentralized transporta-
tion networks where each directed link from node i to j
is associated with a delay lij , the time needed to travel
along the link. In most real networks, delays depend no-
ticeably on the flow [5], i.e., the number of downloads,
vehicles, etc. per unit time. For example, a single ve-
hicle easily moves at the permitted speed limit on an
empty road, yet slows down if too many vehicles share
the same road. Thus, the choices of some users can cause
delays for others and possibly conflict with everyone’s
goal to reduce the overall delay in the network. As a
game-theoretic consequence, the best options for indi-
vidual users form a Nash equilibrium, not necessarily a
social optimum.
Consider, for instance, the simple network depicted in
Fig. 1(a) [6]. Suppose that there is a constant flow of
travellers F between the nodes s and t which are con-
nected by two different types of links: a short but nar-
row bridge A where the effective speed becomes slower
as more cars travel on it, and a long but broad multi-
lane freeway B where congestion effects are negligible.
Suppose the delay on link A is proportional to the flow,
lA(fA) = fA, while the delay on B is flow-independent,
lB(fB) = 10, where fA(B) is the flow on link A(B). The
total time spent by all users is given by the “cost func-
tion” C(fA) = lA(fA) · fA + lB(fB) · fB where the flow
on B is equal to fB = F − fA. It is easily verified that C
attains its minimum for fA = 5 if the total flow satisfies
F ≥ 5. If F = 10, for example, each link should be taken
by exactly half of the users, resulting in C = 75 (Fig. 1b).
In this social optimum, every user on link B could
reduce his delay from 10 to 6 by switching paths, which
poses a social dilemma: as individuals, users would like
to reduce their own delays, but this reduction comes at
an additional cost to the entire group. In our example,
as long as lA 6= lB, there will be an incentive for the
users experiencing longer delays to shift to another link.
If all users decide to put their own interests first, the flow
will be in a Nash equilibrium where no single user can
make any individual gain by changing his own strategy
unilaterally. All users take the link A, as shown in Fig.
1(c), at the total cost of C = 100. Experimental tests
indicate that human subjects approach the problem of
finding paths in a network from this latter self-interested
perspective, rather than from the former altruistic point
of view [7]. This behavior, known as Wardrop’s principle,
is observed even if, as in our example, not a single user
experiences a shorter travel time in this Nash equilibrium
than in the social optimum. Furthermore, if all functions
2FIG. 1: (color) Illustration of the price of anarchy. (a) Sup-
pose F = 10 users travel per unit time from s to t. (b) The
socially optimal flow sends five users along each link, thus the
total cost is C = 75. (c) In the Nash equilibrium with fA = 10
and fB = 0, C = 100 is higher than in (b).
lij(fij) are strictly increasing (as in most realistic cases)
and the flows fij are continuous, one can prove that there
is always exactly one Nash equilibrium [6].
Although differences between Nash equilibria and so-
cial optima occur frequently in social science, only few
papers have studied the difference between optimal and
actual system performance in real transportation net-
works [4]. To shed light on this issue, we have ana-
lyzed Boston’s road network shown in Fig. 2(a). The
246 directed links in our network are segments of prin-
cipal roads, and their intersections form 88 nodes. De-
lays are assumed to follow the Bureau of Public Roads
(BPR) function widely used in civil engineering, lij =
dij
vij
[
1 + α
(
fij
pij
)β]
. Here dij is the distance of the link
between i and j, vij the speed limit (35 mph on all links,
for simplicity), fij the flow, and pij the capacity of the
road segment. The parameters α and β have been fitted
to empirical data [8] as α = 0.2 and β = 10, i.e., the
delays increase very steeply for large traffic volumes. Ca-
pacity is defined as the traffic volume at “level of service
E” which is approximately 2000 vehicles per hour multi-
plied by the number of lanes [9]. We used Google Maps
to identify the principal roads, measure the distances dij ,
and count the number of lanes for each direction.
Next we have calculated the flows fij for various to-
tal traffic volumes F from Harvard Square to Boston
Common. The socially optimal flows fSOij are deter-
mined by minimizing the cost to society per unit time
C =
∑
link(i,j) lij(fij)fij . This optimization problem,
satisfying flow conservation at each intersection, can be
solved with standard convex minimum cost flow algo-
rithms [10]. For the Nash equilibrium, we can use the
fact that the equilibrium flows fNEij minimize the objec-
tive function [6] C˜ =
∑
link(i,j)
∫ fij
0 lij(f
′)df ′. The price
of anarchy (PoA) is defined as the ratio of the total cost
of the Nash equilibrium to the total cost of the social op-
timum [11] indicating the inefficiency of decentralization;
for example in Fig. 1, PoA = 100/75 = 4/3, or in general
PoA =
∑
lij(f
NE
ij ) · f
NE
ij∑
lij(fSOij ) · f
SO
ij
. (1)
4/3 is in fact the upper bound for the PoA in networks
with affine delays, i.e., β = 1 [6, 12]. For larger β, the
theoretical maximum is higher, but here we are more in-
terested in typical than in worst-case network topologies.
For β = 10, Fig. 3(a) shows the PoA versus the total traf-
fic volume F for Boston’s roads. Except for very small
F , the Nash equilibrium cost is higher than the social
optimum so that PoA > 1. The worst ratio occurs for a
traffic volume of 10, 000 vehicles per hour – a quite real-
istic flow, see [13] – where PoA ≈ 1.30, i.e., individuals
waste 30% of their travel time for not being coordinated.
To what extent are properties of the PoA observed
in Boston’s road network characteristic of networks with
flow-dependent costs? Among road networks, the results
appear to be typical as suggested by an analysis of the
road networks of London and New York in Fig. 2. Lon-
don’s network consists of 82 intersections and 217 links
marked as principal roads by Google Maps. We find that
the PoA can increase up to 24% for trips between the Bor-
ough and the Farringdon underground stations (Fig. 3(a)
inset). Similar results also hold for New York, consisting
of 125 intersections and 319 streets. The inset of Fig. 3(a)
shows that the PoA can be as high as 28% when 12,000
vehicles per hour travel from Washington Market Park
to Queens Midtown Tunnel. The results remain qualita-
tively similar for different sets of sources and destinations
suggesting that a high PoA can generally become a seri-
ous problem.
To gain further theoretical insight, we also con-
structed four ensembles of bidirectional model networks
with distinct underlying structures [14]: a simple one-
dimensional lattice with connections up to the third-
nearest neighbors and periodic boundary conditions,
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graphs with links between ran-
domly drawn pairs of nodes, small-world networks with
a rewiring probability 0.1, and Baraba´si-Albert networks
with broad degree distributions. All the networks con-
tain 100 nodes and have an average degree of 6. Ev-
ery link between nodes i and j has a delay of the form
lij = aijfij + bij , where aij = aji is a random integer
equal to 1, 2, or 3, and bij = bji between 1 and 100.
This affine cost function captures essential properties of
links in important physical networks. In electric circuits,
for example, the flow fij is an electric current and the
delay lij can be interpreted as the voltage difference be-
tween i and j. An affine current-voltage characteristic
occurs in circuits with a combination of Ohmic resistors
(resistances aij) and Zener diodes (breakdown voltages
3FIG. 2: (color) Networks of principal roads (both solid and dotted lines; the thickness represents the number of lanes). (a)
Boston-Cambridge area, (b) London, UK, and (c) New York City. The color of each link indicates the additional travel time
needed in the Nash equilibrium if that link is cut (blue: no change, red: more than 60 seconds additional delay). Black dotted
lines denote links whose removal reduces the travel time, i.e., allowing drivers to use these streets in fact creates additional
congestion. This counter-intuitive phenomenon is called ”Braess’s paradox.”
bij). Further examples with affine cost functions include
mechanical, hydraulic, and thermal networks [15].
For each model network, we go through every pair
of nodes to calculate the PoA for various total flows
F . Then the results are averaged over 50 networks to
find the mean 〈PoA(F )〉 for each ensemble as plotted in
Fig. 3(b). After averaging over many pairs, there are
no longer multiple local maxima as in Fig. 3(a). In-
stead, we find unimodal functions for all ensembles with a
steep increase for small F and a long tail for large flows.
The qualitative behavior can be understood as follows.
The social optimum minimizes C =
∑
(aijfij
2 + bijfij)
whereas the flow in the Nash equilibrium minimizes
C˜ =
∑
(12aijfij
2 + bijfij). In the limit F → 0, both ob-
jective functions become identical and, therefore, 〈PoA〉
→ 1. For F → ∞, the quadratic terms in the sums
dominate, hence C/C˜ → 2, i.e., both objective functions
are minimized by the same asymptotic flow pattern fij/F
and 〈PoA〉 again approaches 1. The maximum 〈PoA〉 oc-
curs roughly where the quadratic and linear terms in the
objective functions are comparable, i.e., aijfij ≈ bij for
paths with positive flow. Ignoring correlations between
aij and fij , we have 〈fij〉 ≈ 〈bij〉/〈aij〉. Since F = c〈fij〉
where c is a factor bigger than but of the order of 1, we es-
timate the maximum 〈PoA〉 to be at Fmax ≈ c〈bij〉/〈aij〉.
In our example, 〈aij〉 = 2 and 〈bij〉 = 50.5, so we pre-
dict Fmax to be bigger than but of the order of 25. Nu-
merically, we find the maxima for our four ensembles to
be between 30 and 60 in good agreement with our esti-
mate. Baraba´si-Albert networks tend to have the lowest
〈PoA(F )〉 and small-world networks the highest, but the
statistical dependence between 〈PoA〉 and F is strikingly
similar among all ensembles.
Knowing the PoA is important, but it is even more
valuable to discover a proper method to reduce it. In a
road network, one could charge drivers toll fees to stim-
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FIG. 3: (color) The price of anarchy (PoA), as a function
of the traffic volume F . (a) In Boston’s road network for
journeys from Harvard Square to Boston Common with BPR
delays with α = 0.2, β = 10. Inset: the PoA in London from
Borough to Farringdon, and in New York from Washington
Market Park to Queens Midtown Tunnel. (b) The PoA in
ensembles of model networks with affine delays. All networks
have 100 nodes and 300 undirected links. The error bars
represent one standard deviation in the PoA-distribution. In-
set: the PoA in regular lattices with multiple random sources
and sinks (“multi-commodity flows”) averaged over 100 to 400
networks. Each pair contributes equally to F .
ulate a more cooperative behavior, but that strategy has
problems of its own. For example, one could charge
a fee for using each link equal to the “marginal cost”
fij · lij
′(fij) so that the new Nash flow becomes equal
to the social optimum. Unfortunately, if collected taxes
are not returned to the users, such marginal cost taxes
do not improve the cost of the Nash equilibrium in the
4case of BPR delays [16]. However, as we have learned
from Fig. 3(b), we can change the PoA by modifying
the underlying network structure. For instance, closing
roads to car traffic is relatively easy to implement and
is, moreover, equally effective for everybody. One might
expect that closing roads only leads to increased conges-
tion. However, contrary to common intuition, Braess’s
paradox suggests that road closures can sometimes re-
duce travel delays [17].
We investigated whether this apparent contradiction
occurs in the road networks of Fig. 2. In the case
of Boston’s roads, we set F=10,000 between Harvard
Square and Boston Common which is the flow where the
PoA reaches its maximum, i.e., where reducing the travel
time is most desirable. We then compare the costs of the
Nash flow on the original network with those on net-
works where one of the 246 streets is closed to traffic. In
most cases, the cost increases when one street is blocked,
as intuitively expected. Nonetheless, there are six con-
nections which, if one is removed, decrease the delay in
the Nash equilibrium, shown as dotted lines in Fig. 2.
If all drivers ideally cooperated to reach the social opti-
mum, these roads could be helpful; otherwise it is better
to close these streets. Similar results are also found in
the other two networks: there are seven links causing
Braess’s paradox in London (F=10,000) and twelve in
New York (F=18,000), see Fig. 2(b) and (c). Of course,
the identified roads may not always be bad because a dif-
ferent set of start and end nodes can change the number
and location of links triggering Braess’s paradox. How-
ever, their existence under the investigated conditions
suggests that Braess’s paradox is more than an academic
curiosity [17, 18] or an anecdote with only sketchy empir-
ical evidence [19]. Nevertheless, more work is needed to
generalize the presented results, for example for multiple
sources and destinations. As a first step, we have calcu-
lated the PoA for such multi-commodity flows (Fig. 3(b)
inset).
Braess’s paradox exists because the social optimum
and the Nash equilibrium react in different ways to
changes in the network. After a link is closed, the so-
cially optimal travel time must be at least as long as be-
fore. However, there is no a priori reason why severing a
link could not improve the Nash travel time. By the same
argument, adding new links can potentially create more
delay in the Nash equilibrium. Hence, a target for future
policies in transportation networks is to prevent unin-
tended delays caused by, ironically, well-intentioned new
constructions that form a disadvantageous Nash flow.
Because convex costs such as the BPR function are com-
mon in economics, Braess’s paradox is presumably also
frequent outside vehicle transportation networks. In fact,
we do not need game theory to find this paradox. It
also occurs in physical networks where equilibrium prin-
ciples can drive the network away from optimality. For
example, currents in electric circuits do not always mini-
mize the dissipated energy, but instead satisfy Kirchhoff’s
laws. As a consequence, removing wires can sometimes
counter-intuitively increase the conductance [15]. Al-
though electrons in a circuit, unlike drivers in a road
network, do not act selfishly, the equilibrium conditions
(Kirchhoff’s laws and Wardrop’s principle) are in fact
closely related. Further studies of the price of anarchy
and Braess’s paradox might therefore lead to significantly
improved flows in a number of important applications.
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